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Department of Health and Human Services
DEPARTMENTAL APPEALS BOARD
Appellate Division
SUBJECT: Oklahoma Health Care Authority DATE: January 25, 2005
Request for Reconsideration
of Decision No. 1924
Docket No. A-04-135
Ruling No. 2005-1
RULING ON REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION
On July 23, 2004, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)
requested that the Board reconsider its June 14, 2004 decision in Oklahoma
Health Care Authority, DAB No. 1924. Under 45 C.F.R. § 16.13, the Board may
reconsider a decision "where a party promptly alleges a clear error of fact or
law." CMS alleged that the Board made clear errors of law and fact in its
decision. We have considered CMS’s arguments and, as explained below, deny the
motion for reconsideration and reaffirm our decision.
DAB No. 1924 involved a disallowance of federal financial participation (FFP)
in the amount of $1,902,390 claimed by Oklahoma on behalf of Oklahoma school
districts under title XIX (Medicaid) of the Social Security Act (Act). The claim
was for school-based health services known as early and periodic screening,
diagnostic, and treatment (EPSDT) services provided in state fiscal year 2000 to
Medicaid-eligible students. States participating in Medicaid are required to
include EPSDT services in their Medicaid State plans. There are no express
limitations in title XIX on the availability of Medicaid FFP for these services,
other than generally applicable limitations such as that they must have been
provided to Medicaid-eligible students for whom the provider has sought
third-party reimbursement. CMS implemented the third-party liability
requirements for EPSDT services in section 5340 of its State Medicaid Manual.
See California Department of Health Services, DAB No. 1285 (1991).
In 1997, CMS issued a document titled "Medicaid and School Health: A
Technical Assistance Guide." The Guide includes a section on "Free Care" which
states in part that "to determine whether medical services are provided free of
charge and, thus, there is no payment liability to Medicaid, a determination
must be made whether both Medicaid and non-Medicaid beneficiaries are
charged for the service" (emphasis added).
In the subject disallowance, CMS determined based on the Guide’s "free care
principle" that the school districts were not entitled to Medicaid funds for
EPSDT services provided to Medicaid-eligible students because the school
districts provided the services to Medicaid-ineligible students without seeking
third-party reimbursement. CMS argued initially before the Board that the
Guide’s free care principle is a reasonable interpretation of section
1902(a)(17)(B) of the Act 1 that
merely clarifies the longstanding policy in CMS’s State Medicaid Manual, and
that this interpretation is entitled to deference since the Secretary had broad
discretion to interpret section 1902(a)(17)(B).
The Board concluded in DAB No. 1924 that the Guide’s free care principle is a
new condition on the receipt of Medicaid FFP which is not contemplated by the
State Medicaid Manual and is not an interpretation of any language in the Act or
regulations. Accordingly, we found no legal authority for CMS’s disallowance of
Medicaid FFP for what were indisputably covered services to Medicaid-eligible
students. We also concluded that, even if the disallowance were based on a
reasonable interpretation of section 1902(a)(17)(B), CMS should have waived the
application of that interpretation.
In its reconsideration request, CMS reiterated its argument that the free
care principle in the Guide is an interpretation of section 1902(a)(17)(B). CMS
also argued that the Guide’s free care principle was issued pursuant to the
authority delegated to the Secretary by that section to set standards for
available resources for determining the extent of medical assistance. 2
As explained in detail below, we find no clear error of law or fact in DAB
No. 1924. We proceed from the basic premise that in order for CMS to impose a
condition on state funding, the condition must be properly authorized by title
XIX or its implementing regulations. As CMS concedes, there is no express
provision in title XIX that places any condition on the availability of Medicaid
FFP for EPSDT services to Medicaid-eligible students for whom a provider has
sought third-party reimbursement. In addition, as discussed below, we correctly
concluded in DAB No. 1924 that the Guide’s free care principle is not an
interpretation of section 1902(a)(17)(B) since the free care principle imposes a
new requirement, rather than merely clarifying an already existing requirement
of that section. Moreover, we reject CMS’s argument (which CMS clarified in its
request for reconsideration) that the Guide’s free care principle was issued
pursuant to the authority delegated to the Secretary by section 1902(a)(17)(B)
to prescribe standards for "resources" for determining "the extent of medical
assistance." That argument fails because the Guide’s free care principle does
not purport to be a standard prescribed pursuant to section 1902(a)(17)(B) and
does not function in that manner. We therefore reaffirm our conclusion in DAB
No. 1924 that the Guide’s free care principle is not a proper basis for the
disallowance because it was not issued pursuant to any authority in title XIX or
its implementing regulations.
This reconsideration ruling is based on the record for DAB No. 1924 as well
as the parties’ submissions in the reconsideration proceeding. 3
The Guide’s free care principle is not an interpretation of any provision of
title XIX or its implementing regulations.
CMS argues in its request for reconsideration, as it did in the original
proceedings in this case, that the Guide’s free care principle is a reasonable
interpretation of section 1902(a)(17)(B) of the Act. An interpretative rule
clarifies the meaning of an already existing statutory (or regulatory)
requirement and does not impose new requirements. 4
In the original proceedings, CMS did not identify the specific language in
section 1902(a)(17)(B) of which, in its view, the free care principle is an
interpretation. CMS now takes the position, however, that the free care
principle interprets the terms "extent of medical assistance" and "resources."
CMS contends in particular that the free care principle is an "interpretation
that services ‘available without charge’ are a resource sufficient to reduce the
amount of medical assistance." CMS submission dated 11/1/04, at 5. CMS also
contends that the free care principle interprets "the definition of ‘medical
assistance’ insofar as it is ambiguous about whether a cost is charged to
recipients or incurred by others. . . ." CMS submission dated 7/23/04, at 10.
CMS is not contending, however, that section 1902(a)(17)(B) itself was
specifically intended to treat free care as a resource for the purpose of
determining the extent of medical assistance and that the free care principle
merely clarifies that intent. Instead, CMS’s real argument (which we discuss in
the next section of this decision) is that the free care principle was issued
pursuant to the authority conferred on the Secretary by section 1902(a)(17)(B)
to determine ab initio what constitutes "resources" for purposes of
determining the extent of medical assistance. Accordingly, CMS’s argument that
the free care principle is an interpretation of section 1902(a)(17)(B) has no
merit.
CMS also argued indirectly that the Guide’s free care principle is an
interpretation of sections 1902(a)(11), 1903(c), and 1911 of the Act, which make
Medicaid the primary payor for 1) services offered by or through the state title
V agency, 2) services included in an individualized education plan or an
individualized family service plan established pursuant to the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), and 3) care furnished in Indian Health
Service (IHS) facilities, respectively. According to CMS, the free care
principle "has been implicitly ratified by Congress" because these "three
exceptions . . . would be unnecessary in the absence of the free care policy."
CMS submission dated 8/16/04, at 7-8. As the Board pointed out in DAB No. 1924,
however, states are obligated to provide services under title V or IDEA, which
would be the funding source in the absence of statutory exceptions making
Medicaid the primary payor for these services. See DAB No. 1924, at 15,
n.17. Similarly, absent section 1911, funds appropriated for IHS would be used
instead of Medicaid funds to pay for health care services furnished in IHS
facilities. Since these provisions do not indicate that Congress believed the
general rule to be that Medicaid providers must seek reimbursement from liable
third parties for covered services provided to non-Medicaid eligibles before the
same services to Medicaid eligibles could be reimbursed, the free care principle
is not an interpretation of these provisions.
2. The Guide’s free care principle is not a standard prescribed by the
Secretary pursuant to his delegated authority in section 1902(a)(17)(B).
In the proceedings on reconsideration, CMS argues that the Guide’s free care
principle was issued pursuant to the
"express . . . directive to the Secretary in section 1902(a)(17)(B) to set
resource standards applicable . . . to the ‘extent of medical assistance.’" CMS
submission dated 11/1/04, at 1. Section 1902(a)(17)(B) requires states to have
standards in their Medicaid State plans for determining Medicaid eligibility and
the extent of medical assistance that take into account only income and
resources determined, "in standards prescribed by the Secretary," to be
available to the applicant or recipient. This clearly gives the Secretary
authority to prescribe standards for what constitutes available "resources" for
the purpose of determining the extent of an individual’s medical assistance
under title XIX. 5
We conclude, however, that the Guide’s free care principle does not represent
an exercise of the Secretary’s authority under section 1902(a)(17)(B) for the
following reasons.
- The Guide was never presented as prescribing new standards pursuant to any
statutory mandate. Instead, the "Purpose" section of the Guide contains the
following statement (italics added):
Because Medicaid policy often changes and evolves, this guide should
not be considered an authoritative source in itself. The guide is
intended to be a general reference summarizing current applicable law and
policy and not intended to supplant the Medicaid statute, regulations,
manuals or other official policy guidance.
Moreover, the Guide does not mention that it is intended to implement
section 1902(a)(17)(B) (nor does it refer to any other section of title XIX
as the authority for its issuance).
- Section 1902(a)(17)(B) authorizes the Secretary to prescribe standards to
determine the extent of medical assistance to which an individual is entitled
under a Medicaid state plan based on the receipt or possession of a resource.
However, the Guide does not set out any standards for the determination under
a State plan of the extent of an individual’s medical assistance based on the
individual’s resources. Moreover, CMS did not allege that the Secretary has
ever required a State plan to include a provision regarding the extent of
medical assistance that is based on the free care principle.
- The Guide is not accompanied by a transmittal from the Secretary or any
official in CMS (then the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA)) relying
on a delegation from the Secretary to issue standards under section
1902(a)(17)(B). Instead, the cover page of the Guide merely indicates that it
was authored by the Center for Medicaid and State Operations.
- The Guide was not published following the notice and comment procedures in
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 553.
6
These procedures must be followed when a legislative rule (referred to in the
APA as a substantive rule) is issued.7
Standards issued under the Secretary’s delegated authority in section
1902(a)(17)(B) are legislative rules. See, e.g., Herweg v. Ray,
455 U.S. 265, 274 (1982) (standards issued under section 1902(a)(17))(B) are
entitled to "legislative effect").8
If the Secretary had intended the Guide as a legislative rule, we presume he
would have issued it pursuant to the notice and comment procedures.9
- The Secretary has issued regulations addressing post-eligibility financial
requirements for Medicaid. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.700, 435.725,
435.726, 435.733, 435.735, and 435.832. These regulations prescribe standards
under section 1902(a)(17)(B) but make no reference to the Guide’s free care
principle. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.3(a). The fact that these regulations
(either as originally issued or as amended) were published following the APA’s
notice and comment procedures, while the Guide was not so published, further
supports the conclusion that the Guide was not intended as a standard
implementing section 1902(A)(17)(B).
Thus, the Guide’s free care principle neither purports to be a standard
prescribed pursuant to section 1902(a)(17)(B) nor functions in that manner.
3. CMS did not provide any basis for finding that the Board erred in holding
that CMS should have waived the Guide’s free care principle here.
CMS contends that the Board erred in holding in DAB No. 1924 that CMS should
have waived the Guide’s free care principle here. CMS argues specifically that
the only waiver authority is in section 1115(a)(2) of the Act, that CMS is not
obligated to grant a waiver pursuant to this provision, and that there is no
evidence that CMS acted arbitrarily by granting a waiver for some states and not
others. CMS submission dated 7/23/04, at 11; CMS submission dated 8/16/04, at
13-14.10 CMS’s arguments misapprehend
the nature of the Board’s holding, however. In essence, the Board held that even
if CMS’s free care principle is an interpretation of the Act, it is not
reasonable as applied to the type of services in question under the particular
circumstances of this case. CMS does not address any of the bases for this
holding in DAB No. 1924, including the undisputed fact that efforts to obtain
third-party reimbursement for the cost of EPSDT services provided in this case
to non-Medicaid eligibles would have cost more than they could produce in
reimbursement. In any event, this holding is not dispositive in view of our
conclusion that the Guide’s free care principle is not an interpretative rule.
4. CMS’s other arguments have no merit.
CMS’s assertions of additional errors in DAB No. 1924 reflect a
misunderstanding of that decision. CMS argued that the Board erred in holding
that the free care principle "cannot supersede the regulatory definition of
‘resources’." See CMS submission dated 11/1/04, at 7, citing DAB No.
1924, at 15. CMS argued that "[m]erely because ‘services available without
charge to the community’ are not included as a resource for eligibility purposes
has no bearing on whether such services should or should not be excluded under
section 1902(a)(17)(B) in determining the extent of medical assistance." Id.
We disagree. The point the Board was making in DAB No. 1924, which we reaffirm
here, was that the Secretary has already chosen to exercise his discretion under
section 1902(a)(17)(B) by promulgating regulations which do not address the
"free care" CMS seeks to treat as a resource here. Those regulations contain no
indication that CMS had the authority to specify any resources for
purposes of determining the extent of medical assistance at some later date in
an informal issuance like the Guide.11
CMS also alleges that the Board made an error of fact in DAB No. 1924
"insofar as it misconstrued the free care policy as imposing conditions on
States or providers concerning non-Medicaid users of a service." CMS submission
dated 8/16/04, at 2. According to CMS, the Guide merely "suggests" that schools
establish procedures, such as establishing a fee schedule and ascertaining
third-party resources for non-Medicaid eligibles, "which would assure that the
services would not be regarded as ‘free,’ thus assuring the availability of FFP."
Id. at 9. CMS is correct that the Guide does not literally require that,
"in order to receive funding for EPSDT services provided to students who are
Medicaid eligible, the state must also seek reimbursement for services provided
to the remaining, Medicaid-ineligible students, either from any third-party
insurers or directly from these students or their families," as the Board stated
in DAB No. 1924 (e.g., at 1).12
However, the Guide clearly requires that a state or other provider establish
that services provided to Medicaid-ineligible students were not free of charge
as a condition of obtaining reimbursement for providing the same services to
Medicaid-eligible students. Moreover, CMS did not identify any other way in
which the Oklahoma school districts could have established that the services
were not free of charge other than seeking third-party reimbursement for the
cost of the services to the Medicaid-ineligible students. Thus, the Guide’s free
care principle is not merely a suggestion, but instead functions to deprive
providers of funding for mandated services based on the failure to follow a
condition on that funding which was not imposed by Congress or by the Secretary
pursuant to authority delegated by Congress. Cf. Pennhurst State
School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, at 17 (1981) (holding that "if
Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must
do so unambiguously") (cited at DAB No. 1924, at 19, n.23).
CMS also asserts that the Guide’s free care principle "gives effect to the
language in section 1902(a)(17)(B) consistent with the overall objective of
preserving Medicaid as the payor of last resort." CMS submission dated 11/1/04,
at 6. This argument does not provide any basis for reconsidering our decision,
however. If the free care principle were an interpretation of section
1902(a)(17)(B) (or some other statutory or regulatory provision), then it would
be appropriate to consider whether the interpretation is consistent with other
statutory and regulatory provisions as one factor in determining whether the
interpretation is a reasonable one. Since we have concluded that the free care
principle is not an interpretative rule, however, there is no reason to consider
this matter here. In any event, as we noted in DAB No. 1924, the concept of the
payor of last resort originates from the third-party liability requirements in
section 1902(a)(25) of the Act, which apply only to services provided to
Medicaid-eligible individuals.13 DAB
No. 1924, at 18-19. Thus, in requiring, as a condition of obtaining Medicaid FFP
for services to Medicaid-eligible students not covered by a third-party payment,
that providers pursue liable third parties in the case of non-Medicaid eligibles
to whom the same services were provided, CMS is applying the concept of payor of
last resort in a manner not contemplated by section 1902(a)(25).
5. The CMS Administrator’s decision on Maryland’s State plan amendment does
not persuade us that there is any error in DAB No. 1924.
In transmitting a copy of the CMS Administrator’s decision on Maryland’s
State plan amendment (identified in note 3 above) to the Board, CMS stated that
"[t]he adjudication constitutes the Secretary’s position on the issues decided"
and that "[t]he Secretary’s position on the free care policy supercedes CMS’
brief [in the reconsideration] to the extent that CMS’ brief is inconsistent
with the Administrator’s decision." CMS submission dated 9/23/04, at 1. CMS
nevertheless specifically stated in a later submission that it was no longer
relying on section 1905(a) of the Act as authority for the Guide’s free care
principle, although this section is the primary authority for this principle
cited by the Administrator’s decision. It is not clear in what other respects
CMS’s arguments on reconsideration are inconsistent with the Administrator’s
decision, nor is it clear to what extent CMS continues to rely on the
Administrator’s decision to support its motion for reconsideration.14
In any event, none of what CMS claims are the "major points" in the
Administrator’s decision are indicative of an error in our decision.
According to CMS, one of the three major points made by the Administrator’s
decision is that "[l]ongstanding Medicaid policy, reflective of the nature of
public assistance, holds that Medicaid funds will not be used to pay for
services that are available ‘without charge’ to everyone in the community." CMS
submission dated 9/23/04, at 1, quoting Administrator’s decision at 21. The
Administrator’s decision does not cite the source of this longstanding policy.
To the extent that the Administrator intended to refer to section 5340 of the
State Medicaid Manual, however, we note our statement in DAB No. 1924, referring
to our prior holding in DAB No. 1285, that "[t]he most significant requirement"
of this section "is that all liable third parties be billed for the cost of any
services provided free to Medicaid eligibles so that the services cannot be
considered to have been provided ‘without charge’." DAB No. 1924, at 17. In
other words, DAB No. 1924 did not undercut the longstanding policy in the State
Medicaid Manual, which is based on the third-party liability provisions in
section 1902(a)(25), that services cannot be "without charge." What the Board
found to be without any legal authority is instead the entirely new provision in
the Guide that states must forego FFP for EPSDT services to Medicaid-eligible
students unless they can demonstrate that third-party reimbursement was sought
for Medicaid-ineligible students.
The second major point of the Administrator’s decision identified by CMS is
that--
[t]here is a compelling federal interest to ensure that the Medicaid
program, a purchaser of health services and items, is not paying for
services otherwise provided free of charge to the community . . . the
Federal government does have a compelling interest in ensuring that both
Medicaid and non-Medicaid eligibles are treated the same with respect to
third party billing for the same services.
CMS submission dated 9/23/04, at 2, quoting Administrator’s decision at 24.
It is not clear in what sense the Administrator believed the free care principle
advances a federal interest apart from the principle itself that Medicaid should
not pay for services to Medicaid-eligible students that Medicaid-ineligible
students receive without charge. While CMS argues that it has an interest in
"preserving Medicaid funds" that is advanced by the Guide’s free care principle
(CMS submission dated 11/1/04, at 2), this interest appears to be fully
protected by the statutory requirement for seeking reimbursement from liable
third parties for payments for Medicaid-eligible individuals.15
In any event, even if the Guide’s free care principle advances a federal
interest, this would only be a factor in determining the reasonableness of the
free care principle if it were an interpretative rule; it does not provide any
legal authority for the free care principle.
The third major point in the Administrator’s decision, according to CMS, is
that there is "no specific language" in either the legislative history of
section 8435 of Public Law No. 100-637 or in that law itself "limiting the
third-party payor requirement to Medicaid-only users of the service and none can
be imputed when the users of the service involve both Medicaid and non-Medicaid
users as in this case." CMS submission dated 9/23/04, at 2. However, in DAB No.
1285, the Board held that the term "without charge" in section 8435 must have
the same meaning as in section 5340 of the State Medicaid Manual because CMS had
not defined that term elsewhere. The Board further held that CMS went beyond the
definition of "without charge" in section 5340 of the State Medicaid Manual when
it required California to show that it had charged Medicaid-ineligible
individuals for the services in question.
Thus, after carefully considering the Administrator’s decision, we find no
basis in that decision for changing the result in DAB No. 1924.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we deny CMS’s motion for reconsideration and
reaffirm our decision in DAB No. 1924 reversing the disallowance.
Judith A. Ballard
Cecilia Sparks Ford
Donald F. Garrett
Presiding Board Member
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